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Abstract
We consider internet service providers incentives to zero-rate, i.e. do not count
towards data allowances, the consumption of certain services, in the absence of
payments from content providers. In a general model with various types of network
e¤ects, service substitutes or complements, monopoly and duopoly, we show that
ISPs adopt zero-rating and that it increases consumer surplus and total welfare if
network e¤ects are strong enough. Capacity investment increases (decreases) with
network e¤ects if services are complements (substitutes). Under competition, the
decision to zero-rate depends the residual network e¤ect, which includes the impacts
of spillovers and brand di¤erentiation.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Zero-Rating
The term "zero-rating" refers to the recent practice of internet service providers (ISPs)
to exempt certain kind of data tra¢ c from data caps under xed or mobile broadband
subscriptions. That is, subscribers can access these services while the corresponding data
consumption is not deducted from their monthly data allowance. Services that are often
zero-rated are social networks (such as Facebook, Whatsapp, Instagram, Twitter) and
video services (Netix). This practice is controversial, as it may conict with the principle
of "net neutrality" which states that all internet tra¢ c should be treated equally.
The principle of net neutrality was implemented in the U.S. through the "2015 Open
Internet Order" (FCC 2015). This order banned providing a "fast lane" against payment
by content providers (CPs), but left zero-rating arrangements to a case-by-case review
due to potential consumer benets (p.66).1 The European Union created its EU Open
Internet Access Regulation 2015 (Regulation (EU) 2015/2120), in force since 30 April
2016 (EC 2015); it does not mention zero-rating explicitly. The net neutrality Guidelines
(BEREC 2016) of the association of European national regulatory agencies provide for a
di¤erentiated treatment of zero-rating (p. 11, para. 40-43). O¤ers which block or slow
down all tra¢ c except the zero-rated services once the data limit is reached are always
considered in violation of net neutrality rules, whereas o¤ers that zero-rate specic a
service, rather than a class of competing services, are more likely to be considered as
such. Any assessment needs to take into account the principles on which the Open Internet
Regulation is based.
The market has been extensively monitored: by the FCC (2017), BEREC (2017),
Ofcom (2017), the European Commission (EC 2017). Some national regulators have
prohibited some or all zero-rating tari¤s. In the Netherlands, the Telecommunications
Act of May 2016 included a blanket prohibition of price discrimination including zero-
rating (This was struck down by a court in April 2017). The German Bundesnetzagentur2
in December 2017 and the Portuguese ANACOM3 in March 2018 declared certain tari¤s
to be in violation of the Open Internet and Roaming Regulations.
1.2 Our Contribution
While we are well aware of the concerns voiced in the Regulations and studies mentioned
above, in this paper we set out to explore further the consumer and social benet side of
zero-rating. In Europe payments from CPs to ISPs are illegal under the present net neu-
trality regulations, but still we see zero-rating o¤ers proliferating. Thus other factors must
make zero-rating attractive to ISPs. Therefore, and contrary to the previous literature,
1The 2015 FCC order of the Obama era was overturned in 2018 under the Trump administration
(FCC 2018).
2See https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/15122017_
StreamOn.html?nn=473132.
3See https://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?contentId=1430837&languageId=1.
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we exclude payments from content providers to ISPs as the reason for the zero-rating of
certain services. Instead, we explore whether network e¤ects can be a su¢ ciently strong
motive for zero-rating, and whether consumers and society benet from this.4 As we
show below, zero-rating in this context has the role of allocating sparse network capac-
ity e¢ ciently, taking into account bandwidth usage and the aggregate value of content
consumption.
We build a model with di¤erent types of network e¤ects (club e¤ects, rm-level ef-
fects or market level spillovers), monopoly or duopoly ISPs with general specications
of subscription and usage (substitutes or complements) demands, capacity constraints
and capacity investment. ISPs endogenously decide whether to adopt zero-rating or not.
While the treatment is general, it is illustrated with a specic model in the Appendix
that satises the assumptions made in the text. We model zero-rating as a choice on a
continuum between full zero-rating (one service is counted not at all towards the data cap)
and a joint data cap (both services are fully counted). This allows us to derive precise
optimality conditions.
Our main results are as follows, rst for a monopoly ISP. Zero-rating is indeed a prot-
maximizing choice for the ISP if network e¤ects are strong enough, and even more so if
costs of increasing network capacity are low. Here the ISP shifts capacity usage towards
the service that creates network e¤ects in order to increase total surplus, independently of
whether services are substitutes or complements. Still, the latter matters for investment:
under zero-rating, stronger network e¤ects decrease capacity investment if services are
substitutes, and increase it if they are complements.
Considering only producer and consumer surplus, if the ISP chooses zero-rating then
it is socially optimal to do so, both under club and rm-level network e¤ects. Taking
into account externalities on third parties only reverses this outcome if the externalities
resulting created by the usage of the non-zero-rated service are very strong. The ISPs
capacity investment decision under zero-rating is socially optimal either club e¤ects, if
services are independent, or if the whole market is covered. Otherwise the ISP overinvests
if services are substitutes and underinvests if they are complements.
Under duopoly competition between ISPs, we nd that the decisive factor for zero-
rating and capacity decisions is the "residual network e¤ect". It captures three forces:
(club or rm-level) network e¤ects on each ISPs own subscriber base, the spillover of
network e¤ects to subscribers of the other ISP, and brand di¤erentiation. The latter
measures the displacement of customers from the ISP to its rival when surplus changes.
Zero-rating remains prot-maximizing under competition if the residual network e¤ect is
strong enough (in particular, of course, if there are no spillovers to start with). We also
nd that ISPs with a larger customer base are more prone to introduce zero-rating based
on network e¤ects.
4In a working paper for NERA, Eisenach (2015) stresses how zero-rating under network e¤ects can
increase market participation, in particular in developing countries. He does not consider the issue of
whether network e¤ects make operators adopt zero-rating in the rst place.
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1.3 Relation to the Literature
Zero-rating has been the subject of little attention in the academic literature so far.5 Yoo
(2017), arguing from a legal point of view, defends that zero-rating should be allowed
because it allows ISPs to di¤erentiate their tari¤ o¤ers. Kramer and Peitz (2018) pro-
vide a policy-focused discussion of zero-rating, weighing the benets and potential social
costs of di¤erent implementations. They give particular attention to "throttling", i.e.
reductions in transmission quality, of the zero-rated services. Similar to our paper, they
consider reasons why ISPs might adopt zero-rating in the absence of payments from CPs,
arguing that arrangements involving payments are illegal under the existing European net
neutrality rules.6
Other papers deal explicitly with payments from CPs to ISPs. Jullien and Sand-
Zantman (2017) consider zero-rating as an instrument to price discriminate between CPs
that provide services that are independent in consumption but of di¤erent value to them.
The ISP charges them for "sponsored data", i.e. zero-rated tra¢ c, and sets a data cap
that restricts usage to the amount where the marginal benets to the ISP does not exceed
its marginal costs. Sponsored data plans are taken up by high-value CPs (for example,
those with high revenues from advertising) and allow the ISP to bring the consumption
of high-value content to the e¢ cient level. In the presence of zero rating, this data cap is
lowered strategically to reduce consumption of the non-zero-rated content, which increases
the ISPs prots from the zero-rated operator. Jullien and Sand-Zantman do not explicitly
consider capacity investments, even though they include a long-run marginal cost of usage.
We show in our paper that zero rating can arise in the absence of payments by CPs, and
also take account of the substitutability between contents. The latter turns out to be
important to gauge the impact of network e¤ects on investment incentives. Furthermore,
contrary to their model, in our setting the zero-rating decision is a¤ected by competition,
through potential spillovers of network e¤ects.
Somogyi (2017) considers the choice between "exclusive zero-rating", where only spe-
cic services are zero-rated, and "open zero-rating", where whole classes of services are
zero-rated, again in the context of payments by CPs to the ISP. He explicitly takes into
account the ISPs capacity constraint and assumes that consumers are rationed at the
subscription (rather than the usage) stage. The retail tari¤ is given exogenously, which
a¤ects the computation of prots in the di¤erent scenarios he considers. We model a
capacity constraint which the ISP takes into account when setting the (non-zero-rated)
data cap and the retail tari¤. The latter is endogenous and depends on the zero-rating
scenario chosen by the ISP.
Schnurr andWiewiorra (2018) consider both zero-rating (without payments from CPs)
and sponsored data as devices to support price discrimination via data caps between
di¤erent consumer types. Zero-rating of services which consumers value similarly increases
e¤ective heterogeneity and the degree of rent extraction for services where valuation is
di¤erent. The authors show that zero-rating in this context reduces consumer surplus,
5It has received quite more attention in regulatory circles, though. There was also a draft paper by
Inceoglu and Liu, which at the time of this writing is no longer publicly available.
6This does not mean that Kramer and Peitz support those rules. Rather, they argue that these rules
impede the e¢ cient functioning of the market due to their blanket nature.
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while sponsored data may increase it if choice is maintained. Contrary to our paper,
they assume that network capacity is unlimited, so that zero-rating does not have the
role of allocating scarce capacity more e¢ ciently. Rather, it is shown that under some
circumstances zero-rating leads to higher prots than a uniform data cap.7
Jaunaux and Lebourges (2018) provide a legal and economic overview, from an oper-
ator perspective, of the short- and longer-run e¤ects of zero-rating on consumers and the
provision of content. They conclude that in the short term zero-rating benets consumers,
and that also in the longer run their freedom of choice is not restricted if sponsored data
plans are open rather than closed. Problems would only arise if ISP and CP are dominant,
so that competitive forces are not strong enough to maintain choice.
Our paper is related to the already vast literature on net neutrality from a general
point of view. Here we only refer to the recent overview by Greenstein, Peitz and Valletti
(2016). They point out in particular that no simple general statements can be made about
the impact of net neutrality rules on investment incentives.
Jeon, La¤ont and Tirole (2004) analyze interconnection between voice telephony oper-
ators in the presence of receiver benets. They nd that operators strategically set higher
retail prices for calls between networks in order to curtail the receiver benets on rival net-
works.8 These receiver benets are similar to the competitive spillover of network e¤ects
in our model, and ISPs equally have an incentive to limit the benets that competitors
subscribers obtain. The strategic e¤ect of spillovers in our setting is that they make zero-
rating less attractive. Schmutzler (2013) considers spillovers in cost-reducing investments
and shows that these may increase or decrease equilibrium investments under competition.
In our setting network e¤ect spillovers always decrease investment incentives.
2 A Model of Zero-Rating with Network E¤ects
2.1 Setup
In this section we consider the case of a monopolist ISP in general terms. In the appendix
we also provide a specic model of usage and subscription demands which satises all the
assumptions made in the text and is used below for some numerical simulations.
Consumers obtain a utility of S (x; y; z) = U (x; y) + z from two services x and y
provided by the ISP plus a network e¤ect from z = nx, the aggregate consumption of
service x.9 U is twice continuously di¤erentiable and increases in both services (Ux; Uy >
0),10 for service x up to bliss points x (y) such that Ux (x (y) ; y) = 0, and is strictly
concave in (x; y), i.e. Uxx; Uyy < 0 and UxxUyy   U2xy > 0. Services are substitutes if
Uxy < 0 and complements if Uxy > 0.
We assume that network e¤ects raise utility,  > 0. Di¤erent models of network
e¤ects are encapsulated in our formulation. "Club e¤ects", i.e. network e¤ects limited
7It can be shown that in their model zero-rating always leads to lower prots than separate caps for
di¤erent types of content, thus they never are an optimal choice of ISPs.
8See also Hoernig (2007) and Hoernig (2014).
9The values of x and y can be interpreted as time spent on each of the two services.
10We will use subscripts for partial derivatives.
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to specic groups of users can be captured by n = v with constant v > 0. "Firm-level
network e¤ects", which depend on network size , are described by n = . Below we
expand the latter denition to market-level spillovers. The assumption that utility from
usage and network e¤ects is additively separable implies that consumersusage choices
do not depend on z: Network e¤ects only count for subscription decisions.
While consumers are homogeneous with respect to usage, they are heterogeneous with
respect to the benets derived directly from subscribing to the ISP. The number of sub-
scribers  is given by the di¤erentiable and strictly increasing function G of the net
benets from usage minus payments. The monopolist ISP obtains all content at zero
cost, but has a cost c per unit of capacity Q.
We model zero-rating as follows: Service x consumes r > 0 units and service y one
unit of capacity per unit of usage. The ISP counts a share  2 [0; 1] of the capacity usage
of service x against the cap, with  = 0 if it zero-rates x and  = 1 if both services count
towards the cap.11 It o¤ers a at-rate tari¤ (F; q; ) with a xed fee F and data cap q
such that rx+ y  q.12 The rms prots are  = F   cQ.
2.2 Usage Decisions
Given a tari¤ (F; q; ), we can assume without loss of generality that the cap binds at
least weakly (otherwise the ISP could increase its prots by investing less in capacity).
Thus subscribers maximize their utility from usage by solving
max
x
U (x; q   rx) :
the solution (x (; q) ; y (; q)) is given by y = q rx  0 (we will concentrate on the
case where both services are consumed, i.e. y > 0) and the rst-order condition
Ux (x
; q   rx) = rUy (x; q   rx)
For further reference below, demand for x depends on  and q as follows:
x =
 rxUxy   rUy + r2xUyy
   Uxx   2rUxy + 2r2Uyy ;
xq =
Uxy   rUyy
   Uxx   2rUxy + 2r2Uyy :
Note that the strict concavity of U (:) implies that the denominators are strictly positive.13
On the other hand, neither e¤ect can be signed in general, since the numerators depend
on the degrees of substitutability and zero-rating.
11For simplity, we allow for intermediate values of , as this helps in identifying when zero-rating is
prot-maximizing.
12Since consumers are homogeneous in usage, tari¤s with usage prices either below or above the cap
lead to exactly the same outcome.
13For any non-zero a 2 R2 we have a0  D2U a < 0; here a = (1; r).
6
The capacity actually used per consumer is
k = rx + y = q + (1  ) rx (; q) ;
which denes the cap q implicitly as a function of (; k). We nd
qk =
1
1 + (1  ) rxq
; q = r
x   (1  )x
1 + (1  ) rxq
:
It would be reasonable to expect qk > 0, i.e. that the cap given to consumers increases
with the available capacity per consumer, independently of the degree of zero-rating.
This does not follow from the assumptions made so far. Therefore we make the following
additional assumption:
(M) rUxy > Uxx:
That is, if services are substitutes then they are not too homogeneous.14 Under assumption
(M) it follows that
qk =
   Uxx   2rUxy + 2r2Uyy
(1  ) (rUxy   Uxx)   (Uxx   2rUxy + r2Uyy) > 0;
since the numerator and the second term in the denominator are also positive due to the
concavity of U .
2.3 The ISPs Problem
Now we consider the ISPs choices concerning tari¤, zero-rating and investments. In the
following sections we will analyze the latter two decisions in detail. Let
S (; k; ) = S (x (; q (; k)) ; y (; q (; k)) ; z (; q (; k))) ;
where z = nx. The ISP solves
max
;k;F;
 =  (F   ck) s:t:  = G (S (; k; )  F ) :
The generic outcome of this prot maximization problem is described in the following
Lemma. In the next section we analyze the actual choices of zero-rating and capacity
investments.
Lemma 1 At the prot maximum,15 the ISP
1. chooses both the degree of zero-rating  and the per-consumer capacity k such as to
maximize per-consumer net surplus including network e¤ects S   ck;
14In our specic model, this condition becomes 1   r > 0, where  =  Uxy 2 ( 1; 1) indicates the
degree of substitutability.
15We assume that su¢ cient second-order conditions for a maximum hold. These do so in our specic
model.
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2. and sets the xed fee as given by (" = FG0= is the subscription elasticity)
F   (ck   z)
F
=
1
"
:
3. Prots increase with the strength of network e¤ects and decrease with the cost of
capacity,
d
d
= z > 0;
d
dc
=  k < 0:
Proof. Consider the Lagrangian
L =  (F   ck) +  (G (S   F )  ) ;
with shadow cost of market share  > 0. The necessary rst-order conditions for an
interior maximum are:
0 =
@L
@
= G0S; 0 =
@L
@k
=  c+ G0Sk ;
0 =
@L
@F
=   G0; 0 = @L
@
= F   ck +  (G0S   1) :
The above results are obtained from  = =G0, which implies S = 0, S

k = c and
F = ck   z + =G0. The boundary maxima at  = 0 or  = 1 are given by the
conditions Sj=0  0 and Sj=1  0, respectively. Su¢ cient second-order conditions for
a maximum are given by the requirement that the bordered Hessian of the Lagrangian
be negative denite. These imply in particular that S is strictly concave in (; k), i.e.
S; S

kk < 0 and S

S

kk   (Sk)2 > 0, and that network e¤ects are not too strong and
subscription demand not too convex, 2  2G0nx   G00=(G0)2 > 0.
As for the last statement, the envelope theorem implies that d
d
= @L
@
= G0z = z
and d
dc
= @L
@c
=  k.
The fact that the ISP charges for subscriptions and not for usage (essentially a two-
part tari¤with a zero usage price) allows him to decouple the decisions on zero-rating and
capacity choice from the actual pricing choices: both are taken to maximize surplus net of
capacity costs. This conrms to the usual logic under to two-part tari¤s: The subscription
fee is used to extract rents, while other decision variables maximize the available surplus
per customer.16
The expression for xed fees provides the traditional monopoly pricing formula, with
"marginal costs" ck   z. The latter term translates the network e¤ect benets from
adding a marginal subscriber, which are x > 0 with rm-level network e¤ects and
zero with club e¤ects. Thus club e¤ects will lead to a higher subscription price (and lower
subscription numbers) than network-level benets.
The last statement of the proposition shows that the model behaves as one would
expect: Network e¤ects benet the rm, at rate 2x under rm-level e¤ects and vx
under club e¤ects. The e¤ect of capacity cost is the obvious one.
16We show below that this is not the same as maximizing total welfare, since it does not take into the
account the actual number of subscribers. The latter is chosen such as to maximize prots, not welfare.
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3 To Zero-Rate or Not to Zero-Rate
We will now consider the rst substantive question of the paper, which is under which
conditions the ISP will choose whether to zero-rate the usage of service x. Above we
found that prots are maximized at the level of zero-rating that maximizes surplus S
(we can drop the capacity cost here).
The rst point to take note of is that the purpose of zero-rating in this context is
to increase the consumption of service x, i.e. change users consumption pattern. A
direct e¤ect of changing the consumption pattern is a reduction in consumer surplus as
compared to users(non-zero-rated) usage given the same capacity per user, since users
would have chosen the latter and not the former usage allocation. Thus zero-rating only
makes sense for the ISP if it brings benets from other sources, such as network e¤ects
(or other externalities that users do not take into account) or payments from content
providers or advertisers.
Thus the choice of zero-rating involves a trade-o¤ between a consumption distortion
and the benets resulting from a higher consumption of some service(s). We nd exactly
this, as described in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 (Zero-rating)
1. The ISP (fully) zero-rates service x if and only if network e¤ects are strong enough,
(1) n  rUy:
2. A joint data cap, rather than partial zero-rating, is optimal if and only if there are
no network e¤ects,
 = 0:
Proof. The derivative of surplus S with respect to the degree of zero-rating is
S =
d
d
S (x (; q (; k)) ; y (; q (; k)) ; nx (; q (; k)))
= (Ux + n)
dx
d
+ Uy
dy
d
:
The condition rx+y = k implies that dy

d
=  r dx
d
, which together with dx

d
= x+x

qq
leads us to
S =
(Ux + n  rUy)
 
x + rx
xq

1 + (1  ) rxq
=
(Ux + n  rUy) rUyqk
Uxx   2rUxy + 2r2Uyy
:
The denominator is negative due to the strict concavity of U , and rUyqk > 0 due to
assumption (M) and the binding cap. With full zero-rating,  = 0, users consume service
x at their bliss-point x (y), thus Ux = 0. Since  = 0 is optimal if Sj=0  0, this implies
that we must have n  rUy.
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On the other hand, at  = 1 (joint cap) optimal usage implies Ux = rUy, thus unless
 = 0 we have (at a binding cap) Sj=1 < 0, i.e. the maximum is found at some  < 1.
Condition (1) provides a simple summary of the relevant trade-o¤s between consump-
tion of the two services. On the one hand, one more unit of good x provides zero direct
consumption benets at the bliss point, but provides network e¤ects as measured by n.
Remember that with n =  these e¤ects are proportional to the user base, while with
n = v they are proportional to club size. On the other hand, the costs of zero-rating
are given by the size of the consumption distortion as measured by rUy, the opportunity
cost of not consuming r additional units of y. This opportunity cost decreases with the
available capacity per customer:
dUy
dk

=0
=
 
Uxyx

q + Uyyy

q

qk

=0
=  UxxUyy   U
2
xy
rUxy   Uxx ;
which is negative due to the concavity of U and assumption (M). Thus the ISP is more
likely to adopt zero-rating if his capacity per consumer is high. Equally, the ISP is more
likely to zero-rate a certain service if its capacity usage r is low, as was found by Dotecons
survey of European zero-rating o¤ers (EC 2017, p.16).
The result for the joint cap further illustrates the above discussion. Clearly, if there are
no benets from network e¤ects (or other externalities or payments from third parties), the
ISP has no reason to adopt zero-rating: Surplus and prots are maximized if consumers
choose by themselves how of each service to consume below the cap.
4 Capacity Investment
We will now consider investment in capacity, for any  2 [0; 1]. Above we showed the
latter is chosen to maximize net surplus S   ck, which together with the optimality
conditions Ux = rUy and yq = 1  rxq yields the rst-order condition
c = Sk =
d
dk
S (x (; q (; k)) ; y (; q (; k)) ; nx (; q (; k)))
=

(Ux + n)x

q + Uyy

q

qk =

nxq + Uy

qk
Again, the trade-o¤ becomes visible: The optimal capacity is achieved when the mar-
ginal costs of capacity are equal to the marginal benets from network e¤ects plus higher
consumption of the non-zero-rated service y. Actually, the network e¤ects term is not nec-
essarily conducive to higher investment, on the contrary: Assuming an interior maximum
with Skk < 0, the e¤ect of network e¤ects on the optimal investment is given by
k =  
Sk
Skk
=
nxqqk
 Skk
=
(Uxy   rUyy)nqk
Skk
 
Uxx   2rUxy + 2r2Uyy
 ;
the sign of which is equal to that of the expression (Uxy   rUyy). That is, stronger
network e¤ects increase capacity investment if and only if Uxy > rUyy, i.e. services are
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complements or at least not very strong substitutes. For zero-rating, i.e.  = 0, we
immediately obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 Under zero-rating, stronger network e¤ects increase capacity investment
if services are complements, and decrease it if they are substitutes.
Proof. For  = 0, the sign of k is equal to that of Uxy.
It seems natural that stronger network e¤ects should lead to higher capacity invest-
ments. Under complements, the ISP will indeed want to encourage higher consumption
of all services, including the non-zero-rated one, and therefore increases capacity. With
substitutes, however, the ISP increases usersbliss points for service x by depressing their
consumption of service y through a lower data cap. As a result, total data consumption
is lower and the ISPs invests less in capacity.
Under a joint cap, stronger network e¤ects are more likely to increase capacity invest-
ment (Uyy < 0), since there the ISP does not restrict usersconsumption of the other
service.
A second interesting issue is whether zero-rating or a joint cap lead to higher invest-
ment. While only one of the two choices is optimal for the ISP, this may be a relevant
question when a prohibition of zero-rating is considered. It turns out that no unambigu-
ous answer can be given in general. Therefore we now use the specic model set out in
the appendix to provide some intuitions.
c
k
Figure 1: n > r (1  )
c
k
Figure 2: n < r (1  )
Figures 1 and 2 depict Sk for zero-rating (continuous line) and a joint cap (dotted
line), which cross at some k such that n = rUy. For strong network e¤ects (Figure
1) the ISP chooses zero-rating, which then implies a lower capacity investment than a
joint cap. For weaker network e¤ects (Figure 2) the outcome depends on the investment
cost: For c below the level of the intersection, the ISP chooses zero-rating; for levels of c
above it, zero-rating is not optimal (some partial degree of zero-rating would be prot-
maximizing). Again the capacity investment chosen is the lower one. This implies that
due to a better exploitation of network e¤ects prots and welfare are higher even at a
lower level of capacity.
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5 Welfare and Consumer Surplus
Total welfare in our model is obtained from summing prots  =  (F   ck) and consumer
surplus CS =  (S   F ), resulting in W =  (S   ck). Welfare depends on both the
surplus per subscriber and the number of subscribers. This does not take into account
that there may be further externalities, on content providers, advertisers, sellers of goods
and services, or society at large. To capture these, dene
~S = S + E + xx
 + yy
;
where E is a subscription externality, and x, y measure the strength of consumption
externalities on third parties for services x and y, respectively. Welfare then becomes
W = 

~S   ck

. In order to separate these issues, we will rst consider the case
without such externalities.
Remember that the ISP maximizes per-subscriber surplus and chooses the subscriber
number separately in order to maximize prots. Thus it does not explicitly take into
account the social welfare e¤ect in this latter choice, and these choices may not be socially
optimal.
We nd, in the case without further externalities (E = x = y = 0):
Proposition 3 Social optimality of the ISPs choices of zero-rating and capacity in the
absence of externalities:
1. The ISPs choices of zero-rating and capacity investment are socially optimal if
either there are no network e¤ects ( = 0), or these are club e¤ects (n = v);
2. When the ISP chooses zero-rating under rm-level network e¤ects (n = ), it is
socially optimal. Capacity investment is socially optimal if either services are inde-
pendent (Uxy = 0), or if the market is fully covered and services are complements
(Uxy > 0). Otherwise the ISP underinvests (with complements) or overinvests (with
substitutes).
3. With rm-level network e¤ects and a joint cap, the ISP underinvests for a larger
range of the parameter space.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix B.
The rst observation is that there are cases where the ISPs decisions concerning
zero-rating and capacity investment do not inuence the prot-maximizing number of
subscribers. This happens when either there are no network e¤ects or if there are club
network e¤ects. In both cases the externality between consumers does not depend on the
ISPs decisions, and thus there will be no wedge between prot-maximizing and socially
optimal choices.
Under rm-level network e¤ects this is di¤erent, and here the potential for suboptimal
decisions arises. Still, if the ISP chooses zero-rating, then a social planner would do the
same. The reason is that "more" zero-rating (lower ) increases the consumption of the
zero-rated good, which raises social surplus overall since network e¤ects are strong enough.
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The situation is more complicated concerning capacity investments. If the market is not
fully covered then the ISPs capacity choice is only socially optimal if the services are
independent in demand. If they are substitutes then it would be socially optimal to
move more consumption to the zero-rated good, reducing capacity while doing so; with
complements the opposite is true.
Finally, with rm-level network e¤ects and a joint cap it is socially optimal to invest
more in capacity, thus there are more cases when underinvestment occurs. While a joint
cap would not be prot-maximizing if  > 0, this situation will arise if zero-rating was
prohibited.
If we now consider the e¤ect of including subscription and usage externalities, we
obtain the following conclusions:
Proposition 4 Social optimality of the ISPs choices of zero-rating and capacity with
externalities:
1. Positive subscription externalities under rm-level network e¤ects (nE > 0), and
su¢ ciently strong usage externalities on service x (x > ry) strengthen the social
optimality of zero-rating, while they have no e¤ect on the social optimality of the
investment decision.
2. A large usage externality on the non-zero-rated service y may (but need not) imply
that zero-rating is not optimal or that capacity investment is too low.
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 3 it is shown that with E = x = y = 0 we obtain
dW
dh
= n (S
   ck) dx
dh
for h = k; , where n 2 f0; 1g and  > 0. Taking into account
externalities, we obtain
dW
dh
=
d
dk

~S   ck

+ 

Sk   c+ x
dx
dk
+ y
dy
dk

;
which can be written as
dW
d
=

n

~S   ck

+ 
 
x   ry
 dx
d
;
dW
dk
=

n

~S   ck

+ 
 
x   ry
 dx
dk
+ y:
Both nE > 0 and x > ry then strengthen the social optimality of  = 0, but do not
a¤ect the optimality of the investment decision (since the sign of the term in parentheses
does not become negative). On the other hand, a large y > 0 may imply that zero-rating
is not optimal (if ny < r), and underinvestment in capacity.
The additional terms in the expression for social welfare on the one hand increase
welfare per subscriber and therefore raise the socially optimal number of subscribers.
This favours zero-rating. On the other hand, the e¤ect of usage externalities depend on
whether the externalities are stronger with respect to the zero-rated or non-zero-rated
service, as one would expect.
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A related issue is whether consumers benet or not from an ISPs decision to adopt
zero-rating due to network e¤ects. While zero-rating increases per-consumer surplus if
network e¤ects are strong, this surplus is at least partially extracted through subscription
payments, and, as mentioned above, zero-rating itself creates a distortion in the relative
consumption of the two services. Therefore it is not immediately obvious that zero-rating
should increase consumer surplus; but the following Proposition shows that this is indeed
the case:
Proposition 5 If the ISP adopts zero-rating due to network e¤ects, consumer surplus
either remains constant (if either  = 0 or with club e¤ects) or increases (under rm-
level network e¤ects).
Proof. Consumer surplus is CS =  (S   F ). We have
dCS
d
= (S   F )G0d (S
   F )
d
+
d (S   F )
d
G (S   F )
=
d
d

S   F + 
G0

= n
dx
d
 (S   ck + nx) :
Since the term in parentheses is positive and dx=d < 0, either n = 0 or dCS=d < 0
at  = 0.
Essentially, any action that increases net surplus S   F per consumer also increases
participation and therefore has a double e¤ect on consumer surplus. One such action is
the choice of zero-rating but only if network e¤ects are at the rm level, because then
the ISP has an additional incentive to increase subscriber numbers. With club e¤ects
the ISP simply sets a higher xed fee which captures the rents from network e¤ects, but
consumers do not gain from this.
The general take-away from this is that if ISPs adopt zero-rating based on club or rm-
level network e¤ects this increases welfare, while the optimality of the capacity investment
depends on demand-side features. With club e¤ects all the gains go to the ISP, while with
rm-level network e¤ects also consumer surplus increases. Including further externalities
does not fundamentally change these conclusions.
6 Zero-Rating and Competition
Now we assume that two ISPs i and j compete, o¤ering tari¤s (Fi; qi; i), and that con-
sumersutility of usage of services x and y is
Si (xi; yi; zi; zj) = Ui (xi; yi) + izi +  izj;
where i   i  0 and zl = nlxl, l = i; k, with nl = l or v. As above consumers
maximize their utility subject to the cap, irxi + yi  qi, resulting in gross surplus
Si (i; ki; i; zj) = Ui (x

i ; y

i ) + inix

i +  iz

j and net surplus wi = S

i   Fi.
The subscription demand of ISP i is given by i = Gi (wi; wj), with partial derivatives
Giwi >  Giwj > 0, i.e. subscriptions are substitutes and the own-price e¤ect is stronger
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than the cross-price e¤ect. Let i = Giwj=Giwi 2 ( 1; 0) denote the displacement ratio.
We consider the Nash equilibrium where ISP simultaneously maximize their prots over
all variables, given (j; kj; Fj):
max
i;ki;Fi;i
i = i (Fi   ciki) s:t: i = Gi
 
Si   Fi; Sj   Fj

:
Following the same steps as in Lemma 1, we arrive at the following results:
Lemma 2 In the duopoly Nash equilibrium, ISP i chooses the degree of zero-rating i
and per-consumer capacity ki such as to maximize Si   cik + iSj .
In choosing zero-rating or capacity, each ISP does not only take into account their
e¤ects on the surplus provided to its own customers, but also how much subscription
demand is displaced to the other ISP through spillovers of network e¤ects. Following the
same steps as in Proposition 1, we prove the following:
Proposition 6 Let ~i =
 
i + ij

. In the Nash equilibrium, ISP i will choose zero-
rating if
~ini  rUiyi ;
which implies in particular that
1. Zero-rating is less likely to arise (~i is lower) if subscriptions are close substitutes
(i   1) and network e¤ect spillovers are strong (j large);
2. With rm-level network e¤ects (ni = i), larger networks are more likely to adopt
zero-rating.
This decision is mediated by ~i =
 
i + ij

, the "residual network e¤ect", as are
the choices of xed fees ("i = FiGiwi=i),
Fi  

cik   i~iniixi

Fi
=
1
"i
and the optimal capacity:
ci = S

iki
+ iS

jki
=
h
~inix

iqi
+ Uiyi
i
qiki :
Similar to the case of monopoly, under zero-rating capacity investment increases in ~i if
services x and y are complements, and decreases it if they are substitutes:
k~i =
1
   Siki + iSjkiki
niUixiyi
rUixiyi   Uixixi
:
Thus the results derived with a monopoly ISP carry over to the case of duopoly, with the
only change being that instead of the "gross network e¤ect" i now we need to consider
the residual network e¤ect ~i. The latter captures the trade-o¤ between three di¤erent
forces: rm-level network e¤ects, spillovers, and brand di¤erentiation.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored an alternative explanation for the rise of zero-rating tari¤s
which does not hinge on payments from content providers to internet service providers
(ISPs). Rather, ISPs can use zero-rating to better exploit network e¤ects on certain
services, which happens to maximize their prots from subscriptions if these network
e¤ects are strong enough. If zero-rating is chosen it will also be socially optimal, unless,
possibly, with a very strong externality on third parties of the non-zero-rated service.
The optimality condition for zero-rating carries over to duopoly, with the qualication
that in this case either network e¤ect spillovers need to be weak or brand di¤erentiation
strong enough, in order not to outweigh the rm-level network e¤ects. These three forces
are captured succinctly in a measure of the "residual network e¤ect".
Capacity investment is lower under zero-rating than under a joint cap on usage if
investment cost is low enough so that zero-rating is adopted. Whether it is at the socially
optimal level depends on the type of network e¤ects and the level of market coverage.
Stronger network e¤ects may raise or lower capacity investment: This depends on the
degree of substitutability between the services o¤ered at each ISP. Under zero-rating, the
correspondence is exact: with substitutes (complements) stronger network e¤ects lower
(raise) capacity investment.
Further research will consider various issues. For once, we have assumed contents,
including their di¤erentiation, capacity usage and network e¤ects, as given. All these
factors can be analyzed as choice variables of content providers. These will result in an
equilibrium mix of content types which interacts with ISPsdecisions to zero-rate certain
services. Second, our setting can be combined with previous models in order to include
payments from subscribers to content providers, payments from content providers to ISPs,
and issues of market power, into the discussion.
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Appendix A: The Specic Model
Here we set out a specic model of consumption utility and derive its implications.
While consumers are heterogeneous in subscription benets, they all obtain the same
utility from actually consuming services, with utility function
U (x; y) = x+ y   1
2
x2   1
2
y2   xy:
The parameter  2 ( 1; 1) describes the degree of product di¤erentiation, with  > 0 for
substitutes,  = 0 for independent services, and  < 0 for complements. In terms of the
general notation used above, we have
Ux = 1  x  y; Uy = 1  y   x;
Uxx =  1; Uxy =  ; Uyy =  1:
Consumers maximize this utility subject to the cap rx + y  q, and assuming that the
cap is binding we obtain the following optimal consumption:
x =
1  r + (r   ) q
1  2r + 2r2 ; y
 = q   rx:
From the total data usage rx + y = k we can solve for the corresponding cap
q =
1  2r + 2r2
1  r + r (r   )k +
r (1  ) (r   1)
1  r + r (r   ) :
Assumption (M) becomes 1  r > 0, which we have seen to be su¢ cient for qk > 0. Let
K = 1+r
1+
, which is the maximal amount of data that a consumer will use if the cap is
not binding. Thus we only need to consider k  K. On the other hand, y  0 implies
k  r 1 r
1 r (which is decreasing in ), i.e. if the capacity per consumer is too small then
the non-zero-rated service is crowded out. In the following we concentrate on the case
where capacity is above this limit.
Total surplus per consumer at the optimal consumption level can now be written as
S =
1
1 + 
  (1  
2)
 
1  2r + 2r2
2 (1  r + r (r   ))2 (K   k)
2 + n
1  k   r (1  k)
1  r + r (r   )
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Maximizing S with respect to  leads to the interior solution
 =
r (1  2) (K   k)  n (1  r)
r (1  2) (K   k) + nr (r   ) :
A joint cap ( = 1) is optimal only for  = 0, while zero-rating ( = 0) is optimal if
n  r(1 
2)
1 r (K   k). Note that the latter threshold is weaker if capacity per consumer is
larger, i.e. cheaper capacity investment increases the chance that zero-rating is optimal.
As for optimal investment, the condition Sk = c becomes
c =
 
1  2r + 2r2 (1  2)
(1  r + r (r   ))2 (K   k) + n
r   
1  r + r (r   ) :
The right-hand side is strictly decreasing in k, and thus Skk < 0 and there is at most
one solution. Network e¤ects shift investment up if services are either complements or
su¢ ciently weak substitutes - otherwise they shift it down.
Now we compare the conditions Sk = c for  = 0 and  = 1. We obtain for zero-rating
c = CZR (k) =
1  2
1  2r + r22 (K   k) + n
 
1  r ;
dened on r  k  K, and for a joint cap
c = CJC (k) =
1  2
1  2r + r2 (K   k) + n
r   
1  2r + r2 ;
dened on r 1 r
1 r  k  K, where the left boundary is smaller than r. Thus we consider
the interval k 2 [r;K]. The curve CZR has a more negative slope, which means that for
any point k such that CZR
 
k

= CJC
 
k

then CZR (k) < CJC (k) for all k > k, i.e. given
a marginal cost of capacity c investment would be higher under joint caps in this range.
Both curves are represented in Figures 1 and 2 in the text. Remember that the
threshold on network e¤ects depends negatively on the available capacity k. Starting with
the lower boundary on k, if n >
r(1 2)
1 r (K   r) = r (1  ) then CZR (k) < CJC (k)
for all k 2 [r;K], that is, capacity investment would be higher under a joint cap, but
the rm chooses zero-rating and the correspondingly lower capacity investment through
c = CZR (k). For lower values of n there is a k 2 [r;K] with CZR  k = CJC  k exactly
such that n =
r(1 2)
1 r
 
K   k. Denote c = CZR  k the level of cost for which k would
be the optimal investment. Then for c < c the ISP chooses zero-rating and capacity
according to c = CZR (k) < CJC (k), and for c > c zero-rating is not chosen (Here partial
zero-rating is optimal, as long as  > 0).
Appendix B: Longer Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. We will consider both zero-rating and capacity simultaneously by letting h 2
f; kg and considering dW=dh at the ISPs optimal choice given by d (S   ck) =dh = 0,
with
dW
dh
=
d
dh
(S   ck) + d (S
   ck)
dh
=
d
dh
(S   ck) :
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Thus if per-consumer surplus is positive then the social optimality of the chosen level of
h depends on the sign of d=dh. With  = G (S   F ) and F = ck   nx + =G0 we
have
d
dh
=
d (S   F )
dh
G0
=
 
d (S   ck)
dh
+ n
dx
dh
+
d
dh
nx
  
d
dh
G0
+
G00 d(S
 F )
dh
(G0)2
!
G0
= n
dx
dh
G0   d
dh

1  nxG0   G
00
(G0)2

;
which results in
d
dh
= n
dx
dh
; with   G
0
2  nxG0   G00= (G0)2
> 0:
Here  > 0 is implied by the su¢ cient second-order conditions mentioned above. Clearly
d=dh = 0 (the ISPs decisions are socially optimal) if either there are no network e¤ects
( = 0) or if these are given by club e¤ects ( > 0 but n = 0).
Consider now rm-level network e¤ects, i.e.  > 0 and n = 1. Then dW=dh has the
signs of
dx
d
=
rUyqk
Uxx   2rUxy + 2r2Uyy
< 0;
dx
dk
=
Uxy   rUyy
(1  ) (rUxy   Uxx)   (Uxx   2rUxy + r2Uyy) ;
where the latter has the sign of Uxy   rUyy.
Since dx=d < 0 we have dW=d < 0 at the ISPs optimal choice, which implies that
it is socially optimal to have "more" zero-rating than the ISP adopts in particular, a
prot-maximizing choice of  = 0 is then also socially optimal. This e¤ect arises because
network e¤ects increase subscriber numbers.
Now we consider capacity choice. If the ISP chooses zero-rating then dW=dk at his
optimal choice has the sign of Uxy, i.e. is positive with complements and negative with
substitutes. That is, the ISP underinvests or overinvests in capacity, respectively, unless
services are independent or the whole market is covered (in which case higher investment
cannot increase customer numbers). With a joint cap, on the other hand, dW=dk has
the sign of Uxy   rUyy, which positive even with weak substitutes. Therefore the ISP
underinvests for a larger range of the parameter space.
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